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BAUCUS
U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
SENATOR MAX BAUCUS
APRIL 10, 1992
THE 1992 TRADE BILL:
COMPETING IN THE GLOBAL MARKETPLACE
AFTER THE COLD WAR
I am here this morning to talk about U.S. trade policy. To talk about the new ground
rules for global competition in the 1990's.
More specifically, I am here to advocate the passage of a comprehensive new trade
bill. I want to discuss where we're at regarding U.S. trade policy, how we got here, and
where we should be going.
Clearly this isn't a subject that has dominated the headlines during this year's
presidential campaign. Phil Donahue didn't ask Bill Clinton a burning question about GATT
on the Donahue Show two weeks ago.
But I believe our nation's competitive position is very much on the minds of the
American people. The anger so many Americans feel clearly reflects their belief that this
country is behind the eight ball. They know we are in trouble; that we are sliding farther
behind our economic competitors.
We face a time of uncertainty, political volatility, and economic transition. Not just
here at home, but throughout the world.
The end of the Cold War has created a gaping void in world politics. Fundamental
assumptions that have defined the American outlook for four decades are being called into
question.
Make no mistake about it. We are at a defining moment of history.
Change in this new era is occurring not only in the countries of the Warsaw Pact. The
recent elections in France, Italy, Germany, and Great Britain all underscore the turbulence of
the moment. Governments are falling. The supposed victors of the Cold War are being
tossed out on their ears.
Our own elections may have similar results. We will have a substantially new
Congress next November. And possibly even a new President. We are at a watershed in
American politics.
The American people are looking for a new road map to guide them. They know one
era is behind them -- they do not know what lies ahead. But they do know that America
must define a new political and economic outlook that matches the new world we now face.
There is no more important issue than that of how America economically competes in
the world. I believe our current strategy toward making America competitive is at least
outdated and perhaps fundamentally flawed.
How did we get here?
The years following World War II were marked by strong enthusiasm for multilateral
organizations. The Allies had joined forces to defeat totalitarian regimes in Germany and
Japan. Why couldn't they join forces to promote market economies and free trade?
The idea had great appeal. In 1947, twenty three nations signed the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade -- the GATT. In its first forty years, the GATT compiled an
important record of achievement. As its name implied, the GATT was generally effective in
addressing tariffs and other formal barriers to trade in goods. Formal barriers to trade in
goods have been significantly reduced.
But progress through the GATT came at a significant cost to the U.S. The most
important international goal in the Cold War was containing the Soviets, not establishing fair
and comprehensive rules for governing international trade. When trade bargaining threatened
political or military concerns, trade policy was consistently subordinated.
While the U.S. armed itself to the teeth with the weapons of the Cold War, it
unilaterally disarmed on the trade front. The U.S. reduced its barriers to international trade at
a much faster rate than most of its.trading partners.
Moreover, GATT rules now cover only 7% of world commerce. Major sectors,
including trade in services and agriculture, are not covered by the GATT. No international
rules protect intellectual property rights. No international rules address the complex
"informal" trade barriers, such as Japan's keiretsu system of interrelated corporate families.
In 1986, the GATT's contracting parties launched a new round of GATT
negotiations -- the Uruguay Round. The Round began with great expectatioris. For the first
time, it was hoped, strong multilateral rules would govern trade in services and agriculture.
Intellectual property rights would be protected worldwide.
Unfortunately, the promise of the Uruguay Round has not been realized. After six
years of arduous negotiations, the Round is on the verge of complete collapse.
The immediate cause of the deadlock is continuing EC intransigence on the issue of
eliminating agricultural subsidies. If the Round goes down the tubes, blame will lie squarely
on the EC -- particularly the French.
- But even in areas outside of agriculture, the progress in the Round has been only
modest -- a far cry from the lofty expectations of 1986.
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In the service sector, for example, many U.S. industries believe that the Uruguay
f Round would only lock in the status quo in which foreign countries have relatively open
access to the U.S. market, but the U.S. has limited access to foreign markets.
In the area of intellectual property, U.S. industries generally believe they can achieve
more with current U.S. trade laws than they can with the proposed GAIT rules.
And nothing in the Round will address the most important Japanese trade barrier -- its
collusive system of corporate keiretsu.
There is another important point. Negotiating the Uruguay Round has come at a cost.
Republican Administrations have used the ongoing negotiations as an excuse for not using
U.S. trade laws aggressively. For six years, the Administration has often dodged tough action
under U.S. trade laws by protesting that new rules addressing a dispute were "just around the
corner," or that unilateral action would "upset the Uruguay Round."
We have invested almost six years of effort in the current Uruguay round and what do
we have to show for this effort?
We have a right, then, to ask whether the GAIT has simply gone the way of Larry
Bird's back. We have come to a point where multilateralism simply can't carry the full
weight of the complex new international trade system. In short, the GATT needs some bench
time.
I believe we must go in a new direction. The new patterns of world trade require us
to act creatively.
The United States should not abandon multilateralism as an important principle of our
global economic policy. That is not what I am suggesting. But let's not put all of our eggs
in one basket.
We have lived off the laurels of being the world's great military superpower for too
long. The first component of a trade policy involves recognizing what the American people
know already: At least half of our trade problems are here at home.
We have ignored the domestic side of the trade agenda and we have done so at our
peril. Our tax policies. Our inability to educate our future workforce. The lack, at this very
moment, for example, of a comprehensive economic conversion policy -- all reflect our
unwillingness to do our own homework. In short, we have as much work to do in preparing
the practice field as we do in levelling the playing field.
But domestic competitive shotcomings don't justify foreign trade barriers. The United
States is, today, the world's leading export nation -- leading both Japan and Germany. Scores
of American companies are ready to export today -- if they are given a fair shot.
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I believe that the United States must create a new trade strategy that reflects the
economic dynamics of our time. I believe it is time to enact new trade legislation.
Congress has demonstrated enormous patience during the last six years. We have
cooperated extensively with the Administration. We voted for fast-track negotiating authority.
We have allowed the Administration to defer Section 301 cases in favor of the Uruguay
Round. We supported a Free Trade Agreement with Canada.
But for too long, Republican Administrations have sacrificed trade policy substance
and results on the alter of the GATT. But enough is enough. It is time for a new direction.
The core of a new trade bill should be an extension of Super 301. Many of you are
familiar with Super 301. It is the strongest market-opening tool we have. Essentially, Super
301 requires the Administration to annually identify those nations that maintain the most trade
barriers and initiate Section 301 cases against them.
In 1989, the only year Super 301 was actively applied, it was an effective instrument
for opening up markets in Japan and Brazil.
Super 301 also had a deterrent effect. For example, both Korea and Taiwan concluded
new trade agreements with the United States to avoid being listed under Super 301.
All in all, Super 301, demonstrated an impressive record of market opening, even
though the Administration was more than a little reluctant to use it. Yet, even the
Administration's trade negotiators recognize- what Super 301 can do.
At a Finance Committee hearing last January, Ambassador Hills was asked about her
accomplishments in negotiating with Japan. The first three achievements she listed --
agreements on satellites, superconductors, and forest products -- were all negotiated under
Super 301.
The time for re-enacting Super 301 is long past. The arguments against Super 301 by
the Bush Administration are tread-worn and weary. In hearing after hearing, they make their
case with less and less conviction.
"Super 301 will undermine the Uruguay Round," they say. I have a simple response --
What is left to undermine? And how much longer do we have to wait?
If the Uruguay Round argument doesn't work, they try another. "We don't need Super
301," they say, "Regular Section 301 works fine." The Administration is quick to crow about
the Section 301 cases that it has "self-initiated." But we all know that self-initiation only
happens when Congress has the leverage to force the Administration's hand.
The recent Section 301 case against China is a case-in-point. The case was only
initiated because the Congressional debate over MFN gave Congress the leverage to insist on
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a tough policy. I am happy that the case was initiated. But it would not have happened
without congressional pressure.
Experience has demonstrated that without Super 301, very few Section 301 cases will
be initiated and our trading partners will continue to ignore the principle of free trade.
There is a second key element to a new trade bill. Super 301 helps the United States
win new trade agreements. This is critical. But there is another key problem -- enforcement.
We need legislation to ensure that once a deal is done it sticks. Too often we
Americans sign a trade agreement and assume the deal is done, when in fact it is just getting
started.
What's the point of spending years negotiating a trade agreement, only to walk away
when it is time to be implemented? Too often we let ourselves get taken for a ride.
For example, the United States and Japan are parties to an agreement on
Semiconductor Trade. The agreement establishes a 20% target for foreign market share in
Japan. Japan is nowhere near meeting this target. Figures for the fourth quarter of 1991
place the foreign market share at an anemic 14.4%. If history is any guide, the
Administration will criticize Japan for failure to comply, but decline to take serious remedial
action. We need a mechanism to force action.
Legislation to enforce compliance with a signed trade agreement has nothing to do
with being antagonistic toward another nation. It is simply the affirmation of an age old
American principle that a "deal is a deal" -- that you keep your promises. What good are any
trade agreements if we do not stand up for our rights?
Recent experience has also highlighted another area in need of reform.
A provision of U.S. trade law known as Special 301 has been very effective in
discouraging foreign piracy of U.S. intellectual property.
Special 301 works much like Super 301, but it is focused only on nations that allow
piracy of U.S. intellectual property.
However, for Special 301 to be credible, the U.S. must be willing to retaliate if
foreign countries continue to pirate intellectual property.
In two recent cases involving India and Thailand, the Administration has failed to
retaliate even though piracy remains rampant in both countries.
These examples demonstrate that the Congress must take a hard look at limiting the
discretion of the Administration to avoid retaliation if negotiations fail and piracy continues.
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Discussions of a new trade bill often raise the issue of whether or not to give the
American auto industry import relief and in what form.
Much depends on whether or not the auto industry seeks relief. At this point, the Big
Three are speaking with at least three voices. Frankly, if the auto industry decides to go it
alone without protection, more power to it. But if Detroit seeks relief in the form of a new
VRA, Congress must demand a price in return.
Congress will demand a quid pro quo. And that is the intent of the legislation that I
introduced several weeks ago. If the industry wants relief, it is going to have to demonstrate
that it is serious about being competitive.
Let me be clear: Unless the Big Three agree to a very significant quid pro quo, I
don't see auto relief being included in a new trade bill.
The trade policy I am advocating has one aim - to make America competitive in the
1990's. The American people are ready to go in a new direction and they want a trade policy
that puts a premium on results -- not process.
We must be ready to act. April 15th is the deadline established by GATT Director
General Arthur Dunkel for the conclusion of the Uruguay Round. I hope we are all surprised
and the Round is a success. Even at this late hour the EC can end its hold out on agricultural
subsidies and strike a deal.
But it makes no sense to me for the United States to wait any longer to promote our
own interests.
We have waited six years, shown enormous patience, and ought to be willing to strike
out on our own. Our trading partners must recognize that the day of reckoning is here. One
way or another, their trade barriers must be addressed.
I believe a strong tide is rising. The American people are not protectionist. They
know we have to put our own house in order. But there's also a basic belief that we're not
getting a fair shake when it comes to world trade.
In both houses of Congress, in both parties, frustration with the GATT process is
intense. Support is gathering for a new trade policy. Enough support, I believe, to make
some real changes.
There was a clear indication of the depth of Congress' frustration in a debate this
week on the floor of the Senate. The topic was Airbus.
For six years, the United States has been negotiating with the EC concerning massive
subsidies to Airbus -- Europe's aircraft manufacturing industry. These subsidies are illegal
under the GATT Subsidies Code, and threaten one of America's most significant export
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industries.
Last week, the Administration concluded a tentative agreement with the Europeans on
Airbus subsidies. Rather than eliminating these subsidies, the agreement would effectively
condone a fixed level of development subsidies.
The message of the Airbus Agreement is clear. U.S. trade policy is the same today as
in 1947. We will accept half a loaf, even if we are legally entitled to more. If our trading
partners drag their feet long enough, the United States will get tired and give in.
This is the wrong message for a nation entering a new era.
I am hopeful that we can work together with the Administration to forge a new trade
policy. I am not looking to force the Administration into an unpopular veto. My goal is to
enact new law -- not score political points in an election year.
But it's time to get moving. The Cold War is over, and the rest of the world has
already moved on to a new field of competition.
I do not doubt for a minute the capacity of the United States to be competitive. But
we need an agenda. An agenda that demonstrates to ourselves and to our trading partners that
we know how to put our own house in order. And we have to pass legislation, like Super
301 and the Trade Agreement Compliance Act, that tells the world we mean business.
All this is possible if we recognize the fundamentals -- the new economic dynamics
reshaping our global economy require us to think and act in new ways.
We must be prepared togo in a new direction. To let go of old assumptions about
how we negotiate and how we compete with the world.
We need to get the economic practice field in order here at home.
But we must also send one very clear message to our trading partners: If they expect
to continue to export to the U.S., they must open their market to American exports.
Thank you.
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